This book extensively analyzes of the European Union's (EU) approach to Integrated Border Management (IBM), its impact on human rights and EU accountability. Joyce De Coninck tackles the legal and operational challenges that arise and discrepancy with human rights obligations due to operational priorities. The book is particularly relevant in light of the increasing complexity of EU IBM, with further cooperation with third states and increased mandate amazon database of agencies such as Frontex. With a robust interdisciplinary methodology, De Coninck provides a nuanced examination of human rights accountability in IBM. Through comparative legal analysis, she contrasts EU and international legal frameworks, as well as EU lex specialis and lex generalis , identifying critical areas of misalignment. Her work is firmly grounded in both practical realities and the broader academic discourse. As the book's central thesis, EU IBM is characterized by normative incongruence between its formal commitments to human rights and its operational practices, identified by systemic accountability gaps stemming from the EU's fragmented governance structure, the use of informal agreements with third states, and the operational focus on migration control. The book situates these issues within the broader context of the EU's sui generis legal framework and its complex relationship with international human rights law. De Coninck ultimately calls for a recalibration of the EU's legal and operational frameworks to ensure alignment with its human rights obligations.
De Coninck divides her analysis into four parts in eleven chapters. In Part 1, she introduces IBM and systemic accountability gaps, using the example of EU cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard to facilitate pushbacks leading to the return of people to unsafe states. De Coninck critiques the EU's reliance on externalisation techniques, including carrier sanctions, visa restrictions, and the deployment of migration management teams and technology in third states, restricting individuals' right to leave and safe access to protection. In Part 2, she addresses the EU's historical position as an entity not originally conceived as a human rights actor. De Coninck critiques the EU's delegation of border control to third states, shifting human rights compliance to actors with weaker accountability mechanisms, emphasizing that this delegation does not absolve the EU of its international law obligations. Procedural barriers hinder effective human rights protections and limit individual redress. She concludes Chapter 3 by arguing that the EU's relationship with international human rights law is characterized by selective engagement. In Chapter 4, she describes the unique legal and structural framework of the EU as a hybrid entity that combines supranational and intergovernmental elements. This enables the EU to create binding obligations that extend directly to individuals, embedding its legal authority within member states' jurisdictions.
However, this structure complicates accountability, fragmenting responsibilities among EU institutions, member states, and third parties, creating compliance gaps. De Coninck cites informal agreements like the EU-Turkey Statement as an example of externalising responsibilities while avoiding direct legal obligations. She critiques reliance the Bosphorus presumption, which while reinforcing mutual trust among EU member states and upholding mechanisms like the Charter for Fundamental Rights, it inadequately addresses EU policies or practices that fall short of European Convention on Human Rights standards. De Coninck also discusses Article 14 of the Draft Accession Agreement as potentially useful but notes that the co-respondent mechanism, despite recognizing the EU's composite governance, presents practical and procedural challenges in ensuring accountability for actions stemming from informal agreements with third states.